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Laube: Contracts

Contracts
by William T. Laube*
In any given twelve-month reporting period there is, for
some reason, a case emphasis on particular problems in each
major classification of the law. The field of contracts is
no exception. For the period covered by this volume, two
basic contract problems float to the surface in the pool of
reported appellate decisions. They will be treated separately.
I. Additional Compensation: The Obligation to Pay "More
Money".
The first problem discussed, and illustrated by a number of
recent cases, l relates to the obligation to pay "more money"
* A.B. 1934, University of Arizona;
J.D. 1937, University of Washington;
L.L.M. 1945, Columbia University.
Morrison Professor of Law, University
of California School of Law, Berkeley.
Member, California and Washington
State Bars. Author, California Materials for the Study of the Law of Contracts.

The Author extends his appreciation
to Victor T. Schaub, second-year student at Golden Gate College, School
of Law, for assistance in preparation
of this article.
1. The cases are, and will be discussed in the following sequence: Healy
v. Brewster, 23 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1962);
Healy v. Brewster, 59 Ca1.2d 455, 30
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

77

1

Contracts
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 5

for merchandise or services than that provided for in the
original contract. There are various background situations
which activate the demand for "more money," but the most
common are unanticipated cost increases or fluctuating market
prices.
The one industry that in recent years has repeatedly faced
this problem, at least in the reported cases, is the construction
industry. In a most interesting series of opinions, all dealing
with the case of Healy v. Brewster,2 the problem was dissected
and examined in detail. These opinions are valuable, not
only because of what they decide, but because they demonstrate the many different techniques of offense and defense
that are available.
The operative facts of the Healy case, as gleaned from
Justice Burke's opinion,3 were as follows: Healy, as general
contractor for construction of an air strip for the County of
Los Angeles, entered into a subcontract with Brewster to
remove soil from areas designated as borrow pits, and to compact it in place as the subsoil for the airstrip. The contract
required the excavating, transporting and compacting of
approximately 182,000 cubic yards of dirt. The county had
supplied the general contractor with corings of subsurface
conditions including the borrow pits. None of the legends
Cal. Rptr. 129, 380 P.2d 817 (1963);
Healy v. Brewster, 251 Cal. App.2d 541,
59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967); Wunderlich
v. State ex reI. Dept. of Pub. Works,
65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473, 423
P.2d 545 (1967); E. H. Morrill Co. v.
State, 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479,
423 P.2d 551 (1967); Souza & McCue
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.
2d 508, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338
(1962); City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 66 Cal.2d 217,57 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967).
2. The Healy case was appealed to
the district court of appeal and, for the
reasons set forth in an opinion written
by Justice Burke, the judgment of the
trial court in favor of Brewster was affirmed. 23 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1962). A
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hearing was granted by the California
Supreme Court as a result of which the
judgment was reversed and a new trial
granted. 59 Cal.2d 455,380 P.2d 817,
30 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1963). The supreme
court opinion was written by Justice
McComb. The case was retried, a judgment again entered for Brewster, and
again the case was appealed to the district court of appeal. Pursuant to an
opinion written by Justice Pro Tern
Frampton, the judgment of the trial
court was again affirmed, 251 Cal. App.
2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967). Reference to these cases will hereafter be
made by referring to the name of the
Justice writing the opinion.
3. 23 Cal. Rptr~ 917 (1962).
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for the corings indicated the presence of any hardpan. Brewster made no independent soil investigation and relied entirely
upon the corings made by the county.
Under the terms of the subcontract with Healy, Brewster
agreed to be bound by all the conditions imposed upon Healy
in his contract with the county. Those conditions included
a statement that the general contractor should make his own
inspection of the site, and that the soil information given
was to show conditions only as they were believed to exist.
The county's statement in reference to the soil tests contained
the following:
[I]t is not intended or to be inferred that the conditions
as shown thereon constitute a representation or warranty, express or implied, by the County or its officers,
that such conditions are actually existent nor shall the
Contractor be relieved of the liability under contract,
nor the County or any of its officers be liable for any
loss sustained by the Contractor as a result of any variance between conditions as shown on the plans and
the actual condition revealed during the progress of the
work or otherwise. 4
Shortly after Brewster moved into the first borrow pit to
start excavating, he encountered large amounts of hardpan
material. To use such material for the air strip required
additional and expensive earth-moving equipment, followed
by a pulverizing process that greatly increased Brewster's
costs. When Brewster brought this unanticipated difficulty
to the attention of Healy and threatened to stop work because
of it, he was promised "more money"; that is, he would be
compensated for the extra expense if he would finish the job.
Healy tried to pass this additional cost on to the county. Upon
the county's refusal to pay more because of the hardpan difficulties, Healy refused to carry out his promise to Brewster
of additional compensation.
Healy filed a complaint for declaratory relief and Brewster
filed a cross-complaint for damages. The trial court, upon
4. 251 Cal. App.2d at 547, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 755 (1967).
CAL LAW
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conclusion of the first trial of the case, entered a judgment in
favor of Brewster for $61,108.05, plus an additional $16,000
for attorneys' fees. It found the promise to compensate for
the extra expenses enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Upon appeal to the district court of appeal,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, not on the basis
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was necessarily applicable, but instead on the ground that there was sufficient
consideration to render the promise enforceable.
The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing, unanimously reversed the trial court judgment, and granted a new
trial. 5 Justice McComb noted that the theory of Brewster's
original cross-complaint was for either breach of the original
contract or failure to pay for extra work. As the trial court
had found that there had been a failure of proof on both
theories, Justice McComb was of the opinion that it was
error to grant a judgment on the basis of an oral modification
of the original contract in that "their trial tactics might well
have been different had they known the importance of the
oral promise [of modification] during the trial."s The opinion
did, however, discuss the applicability of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.
Upon the second trial of the case, the pleading properly
raised the issue of the enforceability of the oral promise of
"more money" in modification of the original contract. It
also brought into consideration for the first time the matter
of implied warranties. Again, a judgment for Brewster was
entered by the trial court, again there was an appeal to the
Court of Appeal for the Second District,7 and again there was
affirmance of the trial court with a detailed discussion of the
applicability of the different theories applicable to the problem.
5. 59 Cal.2d 455, 30 Cal. Rptr. 129,
380 P.2d 817 (1963).
6. 59 Cal.2d at 464, 30 Cal. Rptr. at
134, 380 P.2d at 822. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel and its applicability

~o
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to the Healy case is discussed infra, this
article.
7. 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1967).
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A. Consideration for Modification
The key code sections for modification of contracts, other
than those covered by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, provide:
A contract not in writing may be altered in any respect
by consent of the parties, in writing, without a new
consideration, and is extinguished thereby to the extent
of the new alteration. ( California Civil Code § 1697)
A contract in writing may be altered by a contract in
writing, or by an executed oral agreement, and not otherwise. (California Civil Code § 1698)

These sections do not use the word "modification" but instead
"alteration." However, for the purpose of the situation under
discussion the words are synonymous. 8
From the statutory language it is apparent that there are
two basic factual determinations that must be made in working
with the consideration problem: (1) whether the modification agreement is executory or executed; and (2) whether it
is oral or in writing. As to an executory written modification of an oral contract, Civil Code section 1697 dispenses
with the consideration requirement and substitutes in its place
the formality of a writing. 9 However, for an executory oral
modification of an oral contract all the elements of a contract
must be present, including consideration. Section 1698, by
use of the word "contract" in the phrase ".
may be
altered by a contract in writing,
." makes consideration
8. "Alteration" is the word usually
used to describe a change made in the
figures or language of a written instrument, often done without authority and
as part of a fraudulent scheme to change
the legal effect of the instrument. Seeton 3407 of the California Uniform
Commercial Code deals with the effect
of alteration of commercial paper. This
is an entirely different problem from the
one being discussed in this article. Here
we are dealing with consensual changes
in the prior contract obligations of the
6
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party, resulting either from oral agreement or a writing integrating that agreement.
9. Dispensing with the consideration
requirement and substituting in its place
the formality of a writing is a device
used in other parts of the California
Civil Code. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1524,
1541. See also the elimination of the
consideration requirement for modification of sales contracts in Cal. Comm.
Code § 2209, discussed infra in this article.
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an indispensable element of every executory modification of
a written contract, as contrasted with an oral one.
The Healy case involved an oral modification of a written
contract. The search for consideration was difficult but ideas
developed as the litigation progressed. Consideration is defined in Civil Code section 1605 as follows:
Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon
the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor
is not lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered, or
agreed to be suffered, by such person, other than such
as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer,
as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration
for a promise.
The stumbling block was that Brewster was already obligated
to remove and compact the required dirt from the borrow
pits. It was argued by Healy that Brewster was doing no
more than he was already legally obligated to do and that,
therefore, there was neither detriment to Brewster nor benefit
to Healy. This effect of existing duty on consideration has
long been the rule of law in California, and most other jurisdictions. 10
Justice Burke was of the opinion that the Healy case fell
within the "unexpected difficulty" exception to the "existing
duty" bar. His opinion stated:
However, the general rule has often been subjected to
the important qualification that such a promise will be
given effect where unanticipated and substantial difficulties arise which cause the contractor to refuse to complete the work at the contract price and the contractee
promises the additional compensation to induce the contractor to continue performance. l l
In applying this "unexpected difficulty" exception it is
accepted that the difficulty must not be within the contem10. A leading case in California so
holding, and referred to in the Healy
case, is Western Lithograph Co. v. Vanomar Producers, 185 Cal. 366, 197 P.
82
CAL LAW 1967
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103 (1921). For a collection of cases,
see 12 A.L.R.2d 80. See also WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, 3d ed., § 130.
11. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
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plation of the parties. The court quoted from King v. Duluth,
M. & N. Ry.,12 which emphasized this point. 13 The court also
distinguished Western Lithograph Company v. Vanomar Producers,14 in that the difficulty in that case resulted from an
increase in the market price of labor and materials and,
therefore, in that court's opinion, was within the contemplation of the parties.
It was on this issue of contemplation of the risk that Justice
McComb differed with Justice Burke. In reviewing the facts
of the case, Justice McComb emphasized that Brewster relied
entirely on the soil tests made by the county engineer and
made no test of his own, and that Brewster was aware that
the county had expressly disclaimed liability for any erroneous
soil reports. From these facts it can be concluded that
Brewster assumed the risk of error in the soil testing; or
to say the same thing in a different way, assumed the risk of
mistake. If there is no right to be discharged from the original
contract under the doctrine of rescission for mistake, then
the duty to perform remains and performance of that duty
fails as consideration.
In applying the "unexpected difficulty" rule to establish
the consideration for the modification agreement, there still
remains a cloudy area in California law. Must the difficulty,
the risk of which has not been assumed, be such as to be a
basis for rescission for mistake? If it is a basis for rescission,
the consideration can better be described as the giving up
of a right to rescind. The King case, in describing a sufficient
"unexpected difficulty", stated that the mistake:
need not be such as would legally justify the party in
his refusal to perform his contract, unless promised extra
pay, or to justify a court of equity in relieving him from
the contract; for they are sufficient if they are of such
a character as to render the party's demand for extra
pay manifestly fair, so as to rebut all inference that he
12. 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105
(1895).
13. The court stated that the difficulties and burdens "must be substantial,
unforeseen, and not within the contem-

plation of the parties when the contract
was made." 61 Minn. at 488, 63 N.W.
at 1107.
14. 185 Cal. 366, 197 P. 103 (1921).
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

83

7

Contracts

Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 5

is seeking to be relieved from an unsatisfactory contract,
or to take advantage of the necessities of the opposite
party to coerce from him a promise for further compensation. 15
In the first Healy trial, the trial judge instructed the jury:
that there had been a mutual mistake of fact on the part
of [Healy and Brewster] regarding the nature of the soil
to be excavated, and that the execution of the contract
having been conditioned thereon to a considerable degree, [Brewster] for a reasonable time after discovering
the mistake had the right to rescind the contract, but
that he had not exercised such right. 16
As indicated, if a right to rescind exists, the consideration
problem becomes, at least, easier.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Draft
No.2, 1965) adopts the rule of the King case in a proposed
new section 89D.17 However, where there is an "existing
duty" to perform, it does not call completion of the performance "consideration." The comment to the proposed section
explains that to do so would violate the traditional pre-existing
duty rule of the contracts restatement. Instead, the new
section has been placed in a chapter entitled "Contracts Without Consideration." However sensible this restatement approach may be, in California it runs into the difficulty of the
language of Civil Code section 1698 which requires a "contract." The elements of contract are set forth in Civil Code
section 1550 and include "consideration."18
15. 61 Minn. at 488, 63 N.W. at 1107
(1895).
16. 59 Cal.2d at 462, 30 Cal. Rptr.
at 133, 380 P.2d at 821 (1963).
17. § 89D.

MODIFICATION OF EXECU-

TORY CONTRACT.

"A promise modifying a duty under
a contract not fully performed on either
side is binding
(a) if the modification is fair and
equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated when contract was made; or
84
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(b) to the extent provided by statute;
or
(c) to the extent that justice requires
enforcement in view of material change
of position in reliance on the promise."
18. That section provides: "It is essential to the existence of a contract that
there should be:
1. Parties capable of contracting;
2. Their consent;
3. A lawful object; and,
4. A sufficient cause or consideration."
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While Civil Code section 1605 gives the common-law definition of consideration, the section immediately following
states additional situations that are also a "good consideration" for a promise. That section provides:
An existing legal obligation resting upon the promisor,
or a moral obligation originating in some benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the
promisee, is also a good consideration for a promise,
to an extent corresponding with the extent of the obligation, but no further or otherwise.
This section has been examined many times by California
courts and there are numerous statements in the cases that
the moral obligation referred to is one resulting from some
past legal obligation. I9 However, all the literal wording of
the statute requires is "a moral obligation originating in some
benefit conferred upon the promisor or prejudice suffered
by the promisee." An argument can be made that while
"pre-existing duty" may bar the sufficiency of the consideration
under section 1605, it does not have that result under section
1606. In other words, the willingness to proceed in spite
of the difficulty creates a moral obligation to compensate
for the increased costs.
Upon appea120 following retrial of the Healy case, Justice
Frampton affirmed the findings of the trial court on the issue
of consideration. Three separate bases were articulated. The
trial court had found that promising to pay for work rendered
after encountering unforeseen difficulty is enforceable as consideration supported notwithstanding the existing duty. There
is no neat and unencumbered holding that such a promise
was enforceable without consideration under the approach of
section 89D of Restatement of Contracts (Second). In his
opinion, Justice Frampton set forth Civil Code sections 1605
and 1606 in their entirety. It is difficult to tell whether he
19. See e.g. Leonard v. Gallagher,
235 Cal. App.2d 362, 45 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1965); Foltz v. First Trust & Say. Bank
of Pasadena, 86 Cal. App.2d 59, 194 P.
2d 95 (1948).

20. 251 Cal. App.2d 541, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 752 (1967).

CAL LAW 1967
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felt that the pre-existing duty bar does not apply when unexpected difficulty is present, or whether he was following
the line of reasoning just set forth that such difficulty at least
creates a moral obligation under section 1606.
As a separate basis for consideration, the trial court also
had found that Brewster was entitled to rescind for mutual
mistake, and that the giving up of that right of rescission
was sufficient. Justice Frampton recognized that there can
be no rescission for mistake if the party has assumed that
risk. In working out his conclusion on this issue, he referred
to facts that were not mentioned in either of the two prior
opinions. Whether they were even disclosed in the first trial
is not known. He pointed out that soil borings are usually
handled by using a drill with a hollow cylinder that cuts out a
core from the subsurface. The composition of the core is
then analyzed and its structure plotted as a vertical profile.
What had happened here, unfortunately, was that the county
engineer had used a rotary earth drill rather than the customary coring drill. The rotary drill ground up the subsoil
as it extracted it. Ground-up hardpan has the same characteristics as sand and sandy loam, which explains why the
county engineer's report was so misleading. From these facts
Justice Frampton concluded that while Brewster might have
assumed the risk of subsoil conditions if the county's borings
had been made in the accepted manner, he did not assume
the risk when borings were made in a manner he had no reason
to anticipate. This is a forceful demonstration of the importance of getting into evidence all facts that bear upon assumption of risk. Too many attorneys have evidence available
to them that is never introduced, either because they don't
know of its existence because of failure to make a sufficient
investigation of their case, or because they fail to realize its
importance.
A third basis for consideration was also expressed in the
OpInIOn. The court stated: "Also forbearance to press a
claim or a promise of such forbearance, may be a sufficient
consideration even though the claim is wholly ill-founded."l
1. 251 Cal. App.2d at 551, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 758.
86
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The right to pursue a claim is a legal right, even though if
pursued no remedy may be granted. To forego such right is
therefore a legal detriment, and thus within the definition of
Civil Code section 1605. The only weakness of this theory
is that the facts must show that the promise to pay was given
as a "bargained-for exchange" for the forbearance of, or the
promise to forbear, the assertion of the claim. The fact that
forbearance is a result of the promise is not enough. It must
be a "bargained-for forbearance." It it at least open to question, from the facts related in the opinions, that such a bargaining process took place.
B. Applicability of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
It is again worth noting that, in the first Healy trial,

Brewster proceeded on the theory that there was either breach
of the original contract, or that the hardpan problem was
an "extra" for which Brewster was entitled to additional compensation. At the conclusion of the case the trial judge ruled
that Brewster's original theories of recovery had not been
proven but that the evidence sustained a recovery by application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Thereupon
the court permitted amendment of the cross-complaint to
conform to proof of promissory estoppel, and the jury was
given a number of instructions relating to the elements and
scope of this theory of recovery.
As previously indicated, the California Supreme Court held
it was error and unfair to Healy to have permitted this amendment at this time of the trial. In addition, the court pointed
out why the doctrine has no application in a case of this kind.
Such discussion is helpful not only in understanding this case
but in forecasting when the application of promissory estoppel
will be deemed proper.
Justice McComb stated that when there is a request for
services in return for a promise to pay money, you have a
bargained-for exchange taking place. In such a situation, if
the services are detrimental there is good consideration, not
promissory estoppel. To use the words of Justice McComb,
"
it is only where the reliance was unbargained for
that there is room for application of the doctrine of promissory
CAL LAW 1967
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estoppel.,,2 As previously discussed, in the supreme court's
view of the case the "pre-existing duty" to perform prevented
the services of Brewster from being detrimental, consideration
was therefore lacking and the doctrine of promissory estoppel
had no applicability.

C. Writing Requirement
When dealing with an executory modification agreement,
Civil Code section 1698 requires not only the elements of
a contract, but that, in addition, the agreement be in writing. 3
It is like a statute of frauds requirement. At times the
writing requirement of section 1698 is confused with the
parol evidence rule. Parol evidence is inadmissible to vary
the terms on any subject that has been integrated into a
written memorandum of the contract. 4 The excluded parol,
however, deals with prior or contemporaneous agreements
at variance with the writing, and not with agreements subsequent to the writing. The reasoning behind the parol evidence
rule is that the integration of the terms into written form fixes
them as the final terms of the contract, superseding anything
to the contrary. Terms subsequent to the writing are new
terms never previously integrated, and the requirement that
they be in writing is imposed to prevent fraudulent claims
of modification. Parol becomes inadmissible because of the
protective writing requirement, not because of any concept
of finality of the agreement process.
In the Healy case the promise to pay more money was oral.
For that reason alone it would have been unenforceable had
it remained executory. The only thing that saved it was the
finding of execution of the agreement.

D. Execution of the Modification
As has already been stated, a modification becomes enforceable under Civil Code section 1698 if there is a written consideration-supported promise, or if there is an executed agree2. 59 Ca1.2d at 463, 30 Cal. Rptr. at
134, 380 P.2d at 822 (1963).
3. Cal. Civ. Code § 1698 is set forth
in the text of this article, supra.
88
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Civ. Proc. § 1856.
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ment. Case law has carefully pointed out that the word
"agreement" in this second alternative is to be distinguished
from the word "contract" in the first alternative; "agreement"
involves no more than mutual assent, while "contract" requires the four essential elements of Civil Code section 1550. 5
For some reason section 1698 refers only to an executed
oral agreement. There seems no basis for a differentiation
between oral and written agreements as far as execution as
an alternative to consideration is concerned. The motivation
for enforceability applies with equal force to both. It has
long been recognized that once any transaction has been voluntarily performed, the law will not step in and set it aside.
The most obvious analogy is to a gift transaction. While a
gift promise is not enforceable, a completed gift cannot be
revoked. 6 An executed modification agreement, like a gift
transaction, may lack consideration. It often is not literally
a gift, however, because of absence of any donative intent.
But in both situations voluntary execution makes the transaction final for the common reason that the status of parties,
once the transaction has been voluntarily performed, should
be protected.
While it is not difficult to understand why an executed
transaction should be protected, deciding what constitutes
execution has proven quite complex. There are two types
of modification agreements that call for the payment of "more
money." One is the non-consideration-supported promise
where nothing is required by the recipient additional to that
which he is already obligated to perform. In this situation,
execution of the modification will require the money to be paid,
since that is the only performance that has been modified.
The other type is where the modification involves a consideration-supported transaction, in other words, where something
different is required from both parties. The Supreme Court
5. In D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr.
Co. v. Deane, 39 Ca1.2d at 432, 246
P.2d at 948 (1952), Justice Traynor
reached the same conclusion by stating:
"Section 1698 has a dual operation. On
the one hand it invalidates oral contracts

of modification that are unexecuted, and
on the other hand, it validates executed
agreements that might otherwise fail for
lack of consideration."
6. Cal. Civ. Code § 1148.
CAL LAW 1967
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of California decided in Godbey & Sons Construction Company v. Deane7 that where the promise of additional compensation is supported by consideration and the consideration
has been received, there is "execution" of the modification
agreement even though the promised additional funds have
not yet been paid. 8
These principles became of vital importance in the Healy
case as the promise to pay "more money" was oral and
unenforceable without execution. By finding the promise
supported by executed consideration, Justice Frampton concluded that under the rule of the Godbey case there was an
executed modification.
There was also a provision in the original Healy-Brewster
contract that it could be modified only by a written agreement.
It was argued that this provision prevented any operative effect
of the oral modification, execution and Civil Code section
1698 notwithstanding. The court held that such a writing
requirement could be waived by the party for whose protection
it was inserted and that such a waiver had taken place.
E. Modification under the Uniform Commercial Code
Discussion of this problem would not be complete without
some analysis of the solution contained in section 2209 of
Article 2 (called Division 2 in California) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. This article deals only with "sales" as
defined in Uniform Commercial Code section 2106. Section
2209 covers modification and rescission of contracts for the
present or future sale of goods, as well as waiver of performance. While Healy involved a construction contract and not
a sales contract, a study of the amendments made in the
official text of Uniform Commercial Code section 2209 by
the California Legislature aids in understanding the policy
7. 39 Ca1.2d 429, 246 P.2d 946
(1952).
8. In Godbey, plaintiff alleged that he
had agreed in a written contract to do
cement work for the defendant. Later
the written contract was orally modified
to provide for a new basis of comput90
CAL LAW 1967
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was to be paid and to require plaintiff
to submit daily reports to the defendant.
Plaintiff fully performed his side of the
bargain, but defendant only paid a part
of the amount due under the contract
as modified.
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behind not only section 2209 but also Civil Code section
1698 as well.
Prior to the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code in
California,9 the modification of sales contracts was governed
by Civil Code section 1697 and section 1698, as were all
other types of contracts. The official text of the Uniform
Commercial Code was carefully studied by many different
organizations and their recommendations for amendment were
submitted to the Senate Fact Finding Committee on the
Judiciary, to whom the legislation had been referred. The
State Bar Committee and the Credit Organizations Committee
recommended that section 2209 be deleted entirely. The
report of Marsh and Warren recommended that the section
be retained but substantially amended. lO The end result was
that the section was retained but amended to the following
form:
2209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver
( 1) An agreement modifying a contract within this
division needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A written contract within this division may only
be modified by a written agreement or by an oral agreement fully executed by both parties.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section
of this division (section 2201) must be satisfied if the
contract as modified is within its provisions. l l
( 4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (2)
or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an
executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver
by reasonable notification received by the other party
9. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 819. The effective date of the U.C.C. in California
was Jan. 1, 1965.
10. See Senate Fact Finding Committee on the Judiciary, Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature, at 452 (California 1959-61).

11. Subsection (3) was also omitted
from the original enactment of the California Code, but was added by amendment in 1967. See Levy, COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS in this volume.
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that strict performance will be required of any term
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view
of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
Section 2209 ( 1) follows the official text and departs entirely from one of the basic restrictions of Civil Code section
1698 by eliminating consideration as a requirement for modification. Within the sales field, therefore, it is no longer necessary to worry about the difficulties created by the preexisting-duty bar.
There still remains, however, a requirement that the request for "more money" or any other modification of terms
must be in good faith. The justification for the pre-existingduty rule has always been that to hold otherwise would encourage commercial blackmail. Were it not for the preexisting-duty bar, a contracting party, obligated to perform,
could without cause refuse performance unless he received
"more money"; and the other party, realizing the disaster
that would result from cessation of performance, would
knuckle under and pay the unjust demand.
The protection from the danger of blackmail under the
Uniform Commercial Code, after elimination of the consideration requirement, comes from section 1203 which provides: "Every contract or duty within this code imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement,"
and from section 2103 (b), which provides: "'Good faith'
in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
the trade." The comment to the official text of section 2209
explains:
However, modifications made thereunder must meet
the test of good faith imposed by this Act. The effective
use of bad faith to escape performance on the original
contract terms is barred, and the extortion of a "modification" without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor can
a mere technical consideration support a modification
made in bad faith.
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The test of "good faith" between merchants or as
against merchants includes "observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" (section 2-103), and may in some situations require an
objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. But such matters as a market shift which makes
performance come to involve a loss may provide such
a reason even though there is no such unforeseen difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from performance under sections 2-615 and 2-616.
California omitted the official text subsection 2209 (2) and
substituted an entirely new subdivision (2). The official text
set forth a writing requirement only if the parties had so
provided in the original written agreement, or if the contract
as modified fell within the writing requirements of Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-201.12 The California conclusion
was to maintain the requirements of a writing or an "executed"
agreement as contained in Civil Code section 1698. The
result of the Godbey case, permitting consideration-supported
modifications to be executed by performance of only one of
the parties, was legislatively overruled by changing the words
to "fully executed by both parties."13
As originally enacted in California, section 2209 (3) was
also omitted. As all modifications while executory are required to be in writing to be enforceable under California's
section 2209 (2), there appeared to be no reason for section
2209(3). However, as pointed out by Professor Coyne,14 the
oral modification of an oral contract was overlooked. Section
2209 (2) deals only with a written contract. Civil Code section 1698, still in effect notwithstanding the Uniform Com12. Official text subsection 2209(2}
reads as follows: "A signed agreement
which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot
be otherwise modified or rescinded, but
except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be separately signed by
the other party."

13. D. L. Godbey & Sons Constr.
Co. v Deane, 39 Cal.2d at 432, 246 P.
2d at 948 (1952).

14. See Coyne, SOME COMMENTS ON
CONTRACTS AND THE CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U. San Francisco L.
Rev. 1 (1967).
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mercial Code, permits an oral modification of an oral contract
as long as it is supported by consideration. An argument
could be made, therefore, that although an oral sales contract
covering goods for the price of $500 or more would be unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code section
2201, an oral modification of that contract could be enforceable under Civil Code section 1698. To prevent the possibility of any such conclusion, the official text of section 2209
(3) was added in 1967. As to oral contracts not within
section 2201, the modification rules of Civil Code section
1697 apply.
The effect of a waiver that fails to meet the requirements
for an enforceable modification is covered by subsections 2209
( 4) and (5). These provisions require some serious thought
on the difference between them. The comment to the official
text states:
4. Subsection (4) is intended, despite the provisions
of subsections (2) and (3), to prevent contractual provisions excluding modification except by a signed writing
from limiting in other respects the legal effect of the
parties' actual later conduct. The effect of such conduct
as a waiver is further regulated in subsection (5).
"Waiver" is not defined in the Uniform Commercial Code but
the comment provides the clue. A "modification" changes
the terms of the contract by agreement. A "waiver" is one
party's unilateral election not to require a term to be performed, even though the obligation to perform exists. Section 2209(5) shows that the waiver may be of some executory
portion of the contract as well as of some performance presently due. The waiver of executory portions can be retracted
at any time prior to material change of position. However,
a waiver of a performance that has been due is an executed
transaction and the same policy that enforces an executed oral
modification enforces an executed waiver. These waiver provisions of section 2209 do not change California law as it
existed under Civil Code section 1698, and are in accord
with the handling of waiver of the Healy case and other contract classifications.
94
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F. Implied Warranty
While the discussion thus far has involved the receipt of
additional compensation based on the enforceability of a
promise, the Healy litigation also exemplifies the availability
of a quite different theory, warranty; "more money" may come
from a liability created by the original contract rather than
from the enforcement of a subsequently promised payment.
The trial court, on the retrial of the Healy case, made the
following finding:

The original Healy-Brewster contract which required
Brewster to follow the Plans and Specifications constituted an implied warranty by Healy that such Plans
and Specifications were workable, correct and sufficient;
Healy's submission to Brewster of the logs of corings
constitute an express warranty by Healy that such Plans
and Specifications were workable, correct and sufficient. 15
The appellate court affirmed this finding, relying on E. H.
Morrill Company v. State of California16 and City of Salinas
v. Souza & McCue Construction Company/7 both cases decided by the Supreme Court of California during the reporting
period.
There is no doubt that under California law a contractor or
subcontractor who has been furnished incorrect information
as to soil conditions may have a cause of action under a
breach of warranty theory for the increased expense caused
by the true state of the soips It is equally well established
that any such potential warranty liability is capable of effective disclaimer. If the mere presence of a disclaimer clause
in the contract made the disclaimer automatically effective,
the problem would be reasonably easy to solve. Only an
15. 251 Cal. App.2d at 550, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 757 (1967).
16. 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479,
423 P.2d 551 (1967).
17. 66 Cal.2d 217, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337,
424 P.2d 921 (1967).
18. Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal.
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Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338 (1962); Gogo
v. Los Angeles, etc. Flood Control Dist.,
45 Cal. App.2d 334, 114 P.2d 65 (1941).
See also United States v. Spearin, 248
U.S. 132, 63 L.ed. 166, 39 S.Ct. 59
(1918); Christie v. United States, 237
U.S. 234, 59 L.ed. 933, 35 S.Ct. 565
(1915).
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interpretation of the clause to determine the scope of its application would be necessary. What has happened, however, is
that under certain situations the disclaimer clauses, although
present in the contract, have been held to be ineffective. 19 The
real problem, therefore, is to recognize or even be able to
articulate what invalidates a disclaimer.
The leading California cases that have set the guidelines
involve construction contracts with some governmental body
which furnished misleading soil information. The Healy case
was a step removed factually from the cases, the law of which
it adopted. It will be recalled that the basic disclaimer of
liability from incorrect soil representations was in the prime
contract between Healy and the county. That disclaimer was
adopted by Healy in his contract with Brewster by the agreement that Brewster would be bound by all conditions imposed
on Healy by the county.20 This gave Healy the benefit of
the county's disclaimer clause, but if such disclaimer was
ineffective it would not eliminate Healy's warranty liability.
On this point the court, on retrial, cited the additional findings:
In the Court's view, it is unnecessary to the correct
disposition of this case to decide whether Healy is entitled to the benefit of the County's attempted disclaimer
of warranty as to the accuracy of the Plans and Specifications as a representation of actual soil conditions at
the Airport site, since such a disclaimer would not preclude relief from either the mutual mistake of fact or
the bilateral resolution of the "hardpan" problem by a
new executed oral agreement. However, the Court finds
that Healy's warranty of the sufficiency of the Plans and
Specifications is superior to the general disclaimer of
warranty as to actual conditions. 1
Judge Frampton did not in any way indicate that this finding
was in error. The finding is just a conclusion and the opinion
19. See e.g., Thomas Kelly & Sons,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal. App.
2d 539, 45 P.2d 223 (1935).
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does not point out why the disclaimer was ineffective; it merely
states that, under the cases cited, that result takes place. An
attempt will be made, therefore, to summarize what factors
invalidate a soil condition disclaimer.
Taking the easiest case first, a disclaimer of liability is ineffective where there has been an intentional misrepresentation
of soil conditions. In Souza & McCue Construction Company
v. Superior Courf a peremptory writ of mandamus was issued
directing the superior court to allow the construction company
to amend its answer and cross-complaint so as to include a
claim for breach of implied warranty. The court stated:
A contractor of public works who, acting reasonably,
is misled by incorrect plans and specifications issued by
the public authorities as the basis for bids and who, as a
result, submits a bid which is lower than he would have
otherwise made may recover in a contract action for extra
work or expenses necessitated by the conditions being
other than as represented. [citing cases] This rule is
mainly based on the theory that the furnishing of misleading plans and specifications by the public body constitutes a breach of an implied warranty of their correctness. The fact that a breach is fraudulent does not make
the rule inapplicable. [citing cases] Souza's proposed
pleading states causes of action in contract on the basis
of the alleged fraudulent breach by Salinas. 3
The case was then tried and the trial court found that the City
of Salinas had materially misrepresented soil conditions, by
failing to inform Souza and other bidders of unstable conditions known to it. The court therefore granted judgment
against the city. In City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Company,4 the California Supreme Court (reversing
only for the purpose of redetermining the amount of damage)
rejected the city's contention that provisions in the contract
specifications which required the bidders to "examine care2. 57 Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634,
370 P.2d 338 (1962).
3. 57 Cal.2d at 510, 20 Cal. Rptr. at
635, 370 P.2d at 339.
7
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fully the site of the work" and stated that it is "mutually agreed
that the submission of a proposal shall be considered prima
facie evidence that the bidder has made such examination"
prevents the city's liability. The court stated "it is clear that
such general provisions cannot excuse a governmental agency
for its active concealment of conditions."5
The truly difficult case is where there is no conscious and
intentional concealment but the soil conditions turn out to be
disasterously other than represented. This in effect is the
Healy case, and was also the situation in Wunderlich v. State
ex reI. Department of Public Works 6 and E. H. Morrill Company v. State. 7 The Supreme Court of California rendered
opinions in the latter two cases on the same day. Both opinions were written by Justice Peek who also wrote the opinion
in City of Salinas. In Wunderlich it was held that the disclaimer protected the state, while in Morrill it was held it did
not. It takes the closest scrutiny to find the operative differences between the two cases.
In both cases Justice Peek makes it clear that the result flows
from a single determination: was there or was there not justifiable reliance on the part of the contractor?
In the earlier case of A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of
California, 8 the court held that the presence of the disclaimer
clause eliminates a justification for reliance. That is very close
to the approach of Justice McComb in the Healy case. Justice
Peek,on the other hand, eliminates the disclaimer clause as a
conclusive factor. His opinion takes a much deeper inquiry.
He carefully analyzes and compares the facts of Wunderlich
and Morrill and decides that there are differences that justify
opposite conclusions. A few of the factual differences will be
set forth here. Whether the differences he finds establish suffi5. 66 Cal.2d at 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. at
339, 424 P.2d at 923.
6. 65 Cal.2d 777, 56 Cal. Rptr. 473,
423 P.2d 545 (1967).
7. 65 Cal.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 479,
423 P.2d 551 (1967).
8. 238 Cal. App.2d 736, 48 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1965). The court, in holding that
98
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disclaimer clause will always relieve the
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Souza & McCue v. Superior Ct. to cases
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cient guidelines to render predictable the results of cases yet
to be decided is at least debatable.
In Morrill there were plans, specifications, and special conditions attached to the written contract. One of those special
conditions was a description of the soil in positive terms. In
section 4 of the General Conditions was the usual lengthy disclaimer of warranty liability. Judge Peek held that the disclaimer did not overcome the positive statements. He distinguished Wunderlich by pointing out that the soil statement
in that case was more a representation of what the state's soil
tests disclosed, than a positive statement of actual soil condition. Furthermore, he found an important difference in the
fact that in Wunderlich the reference to the soil conditions also
drew attention to the existence of the disclaimer clause, while
in Morrill the disclaimer was in a separate part of the instruments and the disclaimer was not mentioned by cross-reference
in the part of the agreement in which the soil statements were
made. It was also pointed out in Wunderlich that the contractor had available to him information on which the state's
conclusions as to soil conditions were based, a fact found important in other cases having to decide this issue. 9
Justice Frampton classified Healy as being of the Morrill
type where the disclaimer is not protective. While there was
no elucidation in Judge Frampton's opinion as to why Morrill
rather than Wunderlich controlled, the conclusion must necessarily be that the drilling techniques and the manner in which
the corings were handled by the county resulted in Brewster's
"justifiable reliance" on those corings, notwithstanding the
adopted disclaimer.
In summary, about all that can be said is that warranty is
one more theory that should be explored carefully when trying
to work out a basis for additional compensation for a contractor or subcontractor. When disclaimer is present, the
factual search for "justifiable reliance" is going to control the
disclaimer's effectiveness.
9. See e.g., Walla Walla Port Dist.
v. Palmberg, 280 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.
[1960]).
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G. Conclusion
Somewhere behind all of this law is a policy decision. From
studying the many cases involving these problems, it is apparent that it is very difficult for soil engineers to determine
subsoil conditions. Even the best of them cannot predict with
certainty what actually will be encountered when the ground
is opened. To say that the contractor or subcontractor should
make an independent investigation of conditions is no answer.
The contractor's engineers are going to encounter the same
difficulty of prediction that confronted government engineers.
Contractors certainly are aware of this possibility of soiltest error. In most cases, when the error comes to light and
additional expense is imperative, the contracting parties will
work out the "more money" by negotiation and without litigation. When negotiation fails, however, and a solution must be
court-determined, about all that can be done is to decide whether the parties have determined, by agreement, which is to bear
the risk of mistake. If there has been modification of the
original contract to fix the loss, then the sole legal question is
the enforceability of the modification agreement. If the court
has nothing to work with except the original contract, then the
risk-assumption problem is more difficult. Now that the California Supreme Court has armed the construction industry with
the Wunderlich and Morrill opinions, it is obvious what will
happen. The strongest bargaining power usually lies with the
government, or if a subcontract is involved, with the prime contractor. There will now be an incantation of the language of
the Wunderlich case to avoid the language of Morrill in future
contracts. The result will be that the contractor will, more
than ever, bear the risk of loss. Is this a good policy? These
cases usually involve honest mistakes made by both parties.
To throw the loss on to the party who is least able to absorb it,
simply because he is in no position to protect himself, is something that should be given serious thought. The case law of
contracts has had great difficulty over the years dealing with
the inequities resulting from unequal bargaining power. If
there is to be contractor protection, it may have to come from
legislation.
100
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At least the construction industry now has a better idea of
when they will become the "stuckee" of these subsoil errors,
but from now on there will probably be fewer situations when
the contractors can protect themselves from this type of loss
by the terms of the original contract. The industry probably
will continue to do just as they have in the past-rely on their
ability to negotiate a settlement after the error has been discovered. There could be an attempt to cover the risk by increasing the amount bid for the job, but competition makes
that solution unlikely. Even after these new cases, the contractor's real hope in this area remains the sense of fairness of
the other contracting party.
II. Uncertainty: The Incomplete Contract
There has never been a lawyer with any appreciable amount
of contract drafting experience who has not run into the problem of what to do when the parties to the agreement wish to
defer the determination of some particular term or set of terms
until a future date. There are endless reasons for this factual
situation, at least one of which is lack of sufficient information
at the time of drafting for the parties to be able to decide just
how they want things handled.
Before going into the recent cases it is well to point out in
general terms what happens judicially to the uncertain agreement. When the parties have stated that agreement on certain matters will be postponed, it may be declared that the
postponement feature is proof that all that has gone on to date
is part of the feeling-out process-negotiations preparatory to
contract formation rather than contract creation. 10 More
often uncertainty prevents the existence of a contract where
the parties fully intend one, but the agreement fails to provide
the basis for the determination of the existence of a breach and
It is a much more
the giving of an appropriate remedy.ll
painful job for a court to deprive a party of contract expectancy where it is clear that a contract was intended, than to find
that it was not reasonable for the party to conclude that the
10. See Restatement (2d) of Contracts
32(3) (Tent. Draft No.1, 1964), and
comment (c).
§
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32(1) (Tent. Draft No.1, 1964) and
comment (b).
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formation process-offer and acceptance-had taken place.
At times it is very difficult to tell from a court's decision which
of these two types of uncertainty has prevented contract formation.

Coleman Engineering Company v. North American Aviation, Inc. 12 involved a contract for the manufacture by Coleman
of special missile trailers for North American to accommodate its Hound Dog Missile. North American had invited bids
and its invitation had included its basic specifications, including a "configuration of the payload." Coleman therefore concluded that the vertical center of gravity was established at rail
height and submitted a bid, accompanied with a preliminary
stress analysis report, showing its center-of-gravity interpretation. North American, after advising Coleman that it had
been awarded the bid, delivered a series of purchase orders
which contained the terms of the contract. Included was paragraph 9, captioned "CHANGES," by the terms of which
North American reserved the right to change specifications.
The paragraph also stated, "In such event there will be made
an equitable adjustment in price and time of performance
mutually satisfactory to Buyer and Seller, . . .'>13 It was
this clause that set the stage for the lawsuit. The terms of the
contract also contained a "termination for convenience" clause
giving the buyer the right to terminate at any time in accordance with section 8-706 of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation which provides, as the formula for payment upon
such termination, expenses plus a certain profit.
The controversy began when North American made known
its desire to locate the center of gravity at 35 inches above rail
height. It was their contention that the original specifications
did not provide for location of the center of gravity and that
their subsequent specification was not a "change," but a completion of the specifications of the original contract. For Coleman to construct the trailers with this higher center of gravity,
rather than that originally assumed, meant an increase in cost
12. 65 Cal.2d 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 1,
420 P.2d 713 (1966).
10~
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at 4, 420 P.2d at 716,
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of at least $257,000. It was Coleman's position that the
specifying of the higher center of gravity was a "change," and
that they were entitled to an additional amount and an extention of time for performance, all to be mutually agreed upon
in accordance with paragraph 9. Coleman also claimed it was
entitled to stop all work until the agreement was reached, and
if agreement could not be reached that they were entitled to
the payment provided for in the "termination for convenience"
clause. North American claimed that not only was no change
involved, but that refusal to continue manufacturing would
constitute a breach of contract and a discharge of North American from all liability thereunder.
Negotiation failed to provide any settlement, and North
American gave notice of its claimed discharge by breach and
made arrangements to procure the trailers elsewhere. Coleman sued on the formula of the termination clause, and North
American counter claimed for the damages caused by having
to buy the trailers elsewhere at a higher price. The trial court
entered judgment for Coleman which was affirmed with some
modification by the Supreme Court of California. The supreme court opinion was written by Justice Peters, witha dissent by Chief Justice Traynor with whom Justice Mosk concurred. Rehearing was denied. The following is an analysis
of those opinions.
A. Existence of the Contract
Before working out any rights thereunder, Justice Peters had
to first decide whether there was any contract at all, because of
the failure to provide a formula for determination of price and
time of performance following a change order. He started out
with the basic rule that "if an 'essential element' of a promise
is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the
promise gives rise to no legal obligations until such future
agreement is made. "14 Justice Peters then adopted the following test to determine whether an element is essential:
14. 65 Ca1.2d at 405, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 7, 420 P.2d at 719.
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The enforceability of a contract containing a promise
to agree depends upon the relative importance and the
severability of the matter left to the future; it is a question
of degree and may be settled by determining whether the
indefinite promise is so essential to the bargain that inability to enforce that promise strictly according to its
terms would make unfair the enforcement of the remainder of the agreement,15
As to the effect of failure to agree on unessential terms, the
same quotation continues:
Where the matters left for future agreement are unessential, each party will be forced to accept a reasonable
determination of the unsettled point or if possible the unsettled point may be left unperformed and the remainder
of the contract be enforced. 16
It then became necessary to determine whether such basic
matters as price and time for performance could ever be anything but "essential." As was pointed out, "change orders"
present an exceptionally difficult area to apply "essentiality"
tests. The importance of the failure to agree depends in turn
on the importance of the change. There may never be a request for change, in which case the problem will never arise.
On the other hand, as in Coleman, the change may affect such
an important specification of manufacture as to make the original price grossly inadequate.
Because of this inability to evaluate the essentiality of the
change at the time of contracting, and because the parties intended a contract relationship, Justice Peters concluded that
leaving the price and performance adjustments for future
agreement did not prevent contract formation. Such conclusion left many other difficult problems to be decided: (1) Was
Coleman entitled to stop production while the parties were
15. 65 Ca1.2d at 405, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 8, 420 P.2d at 720. For this quote
Justice Peters cited City of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2d at 433, 333
P.2d at 750 (1959) and Metropolitan
Water Dist. of S. Calif. v. Marquardt,
104
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trying to work out the increased compensation necessitated by
the change order, or must it continue to manufacture under the
changed specifications? (2) If the parties failed in good faith
to arrive at an agreed figure, would Coleman be entitled to
receive any recovery? (3) Would the result in any way be
affected by the failure of either party to negotiate in good
faith? (4) Can failure to agree be classified as a "termination
for convenience"?
Chief Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion concluded
that an agreement on the essential terms had not been reached,
but for reasons other than the change order. He traced carefully the offer and acceptance stages of the contract formation.
He found that Coleman's bid was the original offer; that on
June 24,1959, North American sent five "go ahead" telegrams
informing Coleman that it was the successful bidder, but that
such telegrams contained new proposals and were therefore
counter-offers;17 and that the telegrams made it clear that final
arrangements were still to be made. On July 6, 1959, Coleman received the purchase orders, which stated that they became the contract only after Coleman had accepted them. On
July 7, Coleman met with the North American engineers and
found out for the first time that there was a misunderstanding
as to payload center of gravity. On July 15, Coleman acknowledged and signed the purchase orders, but at that time both
parties knew they were in disagreement as to the center of
gravity and as to what should be paid if the construction was
to be other than as had been originally interpreted by Coleman.
Chief Justice Traynor, therefore, concluded that neither
party had a right to assume that a contract had been formed.
Justice Peters, on the other hand, used the same facts to conclude that North American, by permitting acknowledgment of
the purchase orders without objection, had seen fit not to withdraw its offer, that the written acknowledgment was acceptance, and that a contract had been formed.
The two justices, therefore, each used different aspects of
uncertainty. Justice Peters found an intention to be bound
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 1585; American
Aeronautics Corp. v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 69, 317 P.

2d 694 (1957); 1 Corbin, CONTRACTS
(3rd. ed.) § 89, at 378-382 (1963).
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and his only problem was whether the agreement provided a
basis for the giving of an appropriate remedy. Chief Justice
Traynor looked more to the other facet of uncertainty, that
the parties were still trying to work out what both knew were
unagreed-upon essential terms, and that the process of mutual
assent had not yet been concluded.

B. Stoppage of Hfork
Starting with the assumption that a contract existed, receipt
of a change order with no other pricing formula than mutual
agreement forced Justice Peters to select from two alternatives.
Did Coleman have to continue with production during the
period when the parties were trying to work out the price, or
might it have treated agreement on price as a condition precedent to its duty to continue? The latter alternative was held
to be the law, which disposed of North American's contention
that the work stoppage was a discharging breach by Coleman
that freed North American from all further contractual obligations. The court admitted that if the matter involved in the
change order was not an essential, then not only would the
lack of a pricing formula not affect the existence of a contract,
but also the manufacturer could not stop work without being
in breach.
Such a rule forces the manufacturer to a difficult decision.
Although this change order is not of his doing, and is in no
way under his control, its presence requires him to make the
essentiality decision. If it is the correct one he is in no trouble,
but if he should decide that the change is essential and stop
when a court, exercising hindsight, finds it unessential, he has
become the breaching party. Guessing right becomes the price
he pays for the privilege to stop. IS
Chief Justice Traynor objected to the majority's approach.
He felt that to find lack of agreement to an essential term was
18. This is no more unfair than rules
found in other areas of contract law.
For example, an innocent party whose
duty of performance is subject to the
other party's prior performance must
decide at his peril whether he has re106
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ceived "substantial performance" which
will mature his duty. If he makes the
wrong decision whether "substantial performance" has been rendered, and refuses to perform because of it, he ends
up in breach of contract.
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a misuse of the essentiality test, because it resulted in making
the duty to continue manufacture only conditional. In his
opinion such failure to agree prevented formation rather than
rendered further performance conditionaP9
Justice Peters' decision comes very close to classifying the
change provision of paragraph 9 of the contract as unessential
in respect to the existence of the contract, yet essential in determining the existence of the condition precedent. Such a
result is not unpalatable, however, when neither party, at the
time of contracting, has any way to know what change orders
may lie ahead.

C. Measure of Recovery
The determination that a fixing of a new price following the
change order was a condition precedent to Coleman's duty to
proceed, gave it the right to stop performance and prevented
that stoppage from being the discharging breach claimed by
North American. It still left, however, the perplexing problem of whether Coleman was entitled to any recovery for work
to date. Having the right to stop performing does not necessarily give the right to recover for partial performance, especially when that performance has not conferred any monetary benefit on the other party. Justice Peters carefully
reviewed the facts and agreed with the findings of the trial
court that Coleman had acted fairly and in good faith during
the negotiations for settlement of the price controversy, and
that North American had not. When negotiations failed and
North American terminated, in its mistaken belief that Coleman was in breach because of its decision to stop production,
it was held that such termination activated the "cost to date
of termination plus profit percentage" formula of Armed Services Procurement Regulation No. 8-706.
There appears to be little difference between an outright
decision to terminate on the part of a buyer who decides he
does not want to purchase what has been ordered, and the
tactic of placing a change order and then in bad faith refusing
19. 65 Ca1.2d at 411, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 11, 420 P.2d at 723 (1966).
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to agree on a price for that change, however reasonable are the
overtures of the manufacturer. If this activation of the voluntary termination clause is tied to a bad-faith refusal of the purchaser to negotiate, then the use of the clause seems correct.
It is far more difficult to decide what should be done when
both parties, in the best of faith, make every reasonable effort
to work out a price figure but cannot do so. If this is called a
voluntary termination by buyer, it means the buyer is going
to bear the entire contract loss when he is no more at fault
than the manufacturer. Faced with this kind of risk, for all
practical purposes, his change-order privileges are severely
restricted. Yet to hold that good-faith negotiations by both
parties eliminates any voluntary termination results in the manufacturer bearing the entire loss.
Chief Justice Traynor in his dissent found a solution in the
law of restitution. He pointed out that while the parties were
trying to work out the center of gravity specifications, North
American requested that Coleman continue to perform. When
it was finally determined that an agreement could not be
reached, Chief Justice Traynor preferred the conclusion that
such failure prevented contract formation but that because of
the request that performance be continued during the negotiation, Coleman was entitled to the reasonable value of the services performed.
The trouble, if any, with this solution is that although Coleman's performance was requested, it did not result in any
benefit being received by North American. The idea that a
requested performance resulting in benefit can be the basis for
recovery of the reasonable value of the performance is not
new in California. Permitting such recovery without benefit
is new. Such a theory has received recognition elsewhere,20
and Chief Justice Traynor would apply that doctrine here. As
the majority of the California Supreme Court were of the opinion that a contract had been formed, there is no indication
how the majority would have held on this issue of recovery for
20. See Kearns v. Andree, 107 Conn.
181, 139 A. 695, 59 A.L.R. 599 (1928);
Abrams v. Financial Servo Co., 13 Utah
2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962). For the
108
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proposition that the rule of recovery is
based on moral obligation rather than
on benefit conferred, see Note, 26 Mich.
L. Rev. 942 (1928).
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requested performance which resulted in no benefit to the defendant.
D. The Uniform Commercial Code
The one possibility that was not discussed in either opinion
was that of implying a reasonable price to be determined by
the court when the parties could not agree. The Coleman
case was governed by the Uniform Sales Act, as all facts were
prior to January 1, 1965, the effective date of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Under Sales Act section 9, which was
adopted in California in 1931 as Civil Code section 1729, it
was provided:
Definition and Ascertainment of Price-( 1) The price
may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be fixed
in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined
by the course of dealing between the parties.
(2) The price may be made payable in any personal
property.
( 3) Where transferring or promising to transfer any
interest in real estate constitutes the whole or part of the
consideration for transferring or for promising to transfer
the property in goods, this act shall not apply.
( 4) Where the price is not determined in accordance
with the foregoing provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a reasonable price is a question
of fact dependent on the circumstances of each particular
case.
Case law had determined that, under this section, specifically
providing in a contract that the price was to be agreed upon
by the parties did not shift the formula to reasonable price
when such agreement failed. 1
The California Commercial Code now has quite different
prOVISIOns. It provides:
Section 2305. Open Price Term. (1) The parties if
they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even
1. See California Lettuce Growers v.
Union Sugar Co., 45 Ca1.2d 474, 289 P.
2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496 (1955). Cf.

Roberts v. Adams, 164 Cal. App.2d 312,
330 P.2d 900 (1958); Ablett v. Clauson,
43 Cal.2d 280, 272 P.2d 753 (1954).
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though the price is not settled. In such a case the price
is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if
(a) Nothing is said as to price; or
(b) The price is left to be agreed by the parties and
they fail to agree; or
( c ) The price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed
market or other standard as set or recorded by a third
person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer
means a price for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by
agreement of the parties fails to be fixed through fault
of one party the other may at his option treat the contract
as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be
bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not
fixed or agreed there is no contract. In such a case the
buyer must return any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time
of delivery and the seller must return any portion of the
price paid on account.
Had the Uniform Commercial Code been applicable, section 2305 ( 1 ) (b) would have applied to the majority's interpretation of the Coleman facts. Just how it would have aided
the outcome is not clear. Only the court can determine the
reasonable price if the parties cannot agree. It will take time
for price to be settled by litigation. The Coleman case makes
it clear that although the manufacturer is not discharged during the price-fixing period, he can at least stop performing for
that period. The next question is whether, after the price is
finally fixed, the manufacturer must proceed and the buyer
must accept performance. The answer to this lies with the
rules applicable to temporary impossibility. In most instances, if the delay is for any appreciable time, further performance cannot be required of either party. 2
2. See Autry v. Republic Productions,
Inc., 30 Ca1.2d 144, 180 P.2d 888 (1947);
110
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The manufacturer could waive the condition precedent,
proceed to completion and then sue for his price to be fixed
by the court in the litigation. But by so doing he could obtain
nothing until judgment was rendered, and would therefore be
forced to extend credit to the buyer even though the contract
might have provided otherwise.
It should be noted that Commercial Code section 2305 ( 4 )
recognizes that failure to agree on price can prevent formation,
but does not necessarily do so. Chief Justice Traynor, had the
section been applicable in Coleman, possibly would have considered the facts to fall under this subdivision. The case illustrates all too well how difficult is the fact-finding job when
the existence of a contract rests entirely upon intention to be
bound.
The Uniform Commercial Code backs to the fullest degree
the position of Justice Peters; if the parties intend to be bound,
the common-law niceties of offer and acceptance should not
destroy a contractual relationship. Uniform Commercial Code
section 2204 (3) states:
( 3) Even though one or more terms are left open
a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the
parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
Locking the parties together by contract in Coleman accomplished the purposes of this section, and using the voluntary termination clause supplied a convenient "reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
E. Conclusion
While the foregoing has by necessity contained much conjecture, at least one thing is certain-every problem in the
case could have been obviated by careful drafting. An agreement to agree or a contract to make a contract spells trouble.
Many more suitable formulas are available, such as providing
The difficulty dealt with in Autry, of
trying to apply a reasonable price formula in cases of delayed performance,
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may lend more credence to the theories
advanced by Justice Traynor in his dissent in Coleman.
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for arbitration, or any number of other price-setting devices,
should the parties fail to reach agreement. Perhaps Chief
Justice Traynor's opinion would further the necessity for such
clauses. Drafting can also settle the duty to continue performance while the price is being determined. It may well be
that covering these problems originally could have held up
contract formation while they were negotiated and worked
out. But it is seriously doubted that, had they been carefully
covered in the purchase order forms of North American, it
would in any way have deterred Coleman in acknowledging
and accepting those orders; in fact, it might have encouraged
such action.
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